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Duckworth: Raising Our Standards

NOTE
Raising Our Standards: Rethinking the
Supreme Court’s Abortion Jurisprudence
MKB Management Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016).

EC DUCKWORTH*

I. INTRODUCTION
The controversy regarding abortion rights in the United States is perhaps
the single most polarizing and heated domestic issue facing our nation today.
According to the most recent Gallup poll recording American’s views on
abortion, twenty-nine percent of Americans believe abortion should be legal
in all circumstances, fifty-one percent believe abortion should be legal in
limited circumstances, and nineteen percent believe abortion should be illegal
in all circumstances.1
Abortion is an incredibly sensitive subject to countless Americans with
personal beliefs often stemming out of closely-held ideologies rooted in religion and personal liberty, and any decision on the subject should be made
with extraordinary care. As such, when the Supreme Court of the United
States is determining issues on this matter, it should do so with the utmost
consideration, analyzing all implications of the potential reach of its decisions. Recently, Professor Randy Beck summarized the problem with the
Supreme Court’s current abortion standard well:
If the Court asks citizens to lay aside deeply held political and social
views in light of “a common mandate rooted in the Constitution,” it is
crucial to demonstrate that constitutional mandate to the contending
parties. Drawing a line as far-reaching and consequential as the viability rule without a convincing constitutional rationale is more likely
to aggravate the national division over abortion than to quell it. 2

*

B.A., University of Missouri, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2017; Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2016–2017. I would like to
extend a special thank you to Associate Dean Paul Litton and the entire Missouri Law
Review staff for their support and guidance in writing this Note.
1. Abortion, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx (last
visited Feb. 23, 2016).
2. Randy Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
249, 256–57 (2009) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866–67
(1992) (plurality opinion)).
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While the morally “right” or “wrong” issue surrounding abortion could
be argued at length, this Note discusses taking a more reasonable approach in
the analysis of abortion rights. In implementing standards for abortion rights,
the Supreme Court should either apply consistent measures of a fetus’s life
that will maintain its practical implications over time or allow states to use
the resources they possess to do so if the Court will not.
Part II of this Note explores the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence
by discussing MKB Management Corp. v. Stenehjem, which declared a North
Dakota statute barring abortions after a fetus has a detectable heartbeat to be
unconstitutional. Next, Part III analyzes the relevant history surrounding
abortion rights and the rationale behind the precedent relied on in Stenehjem.
Part IV examines the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s decision
to void the statute, along with the Eighth Circuit’s vehement plea for a new
abortion standard. Finally, Part V of this Note reveals flaws in the Supreme
Court’s current abortion jurisprudence and concludes with an outlook on future challenges to the abortion standard.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2013, North Dakota passed House Bill 1456 (“H.B. 1456”), later codified in North Dakota Century Code § 14-02.1, which expanded the state’s
prohibition on abortion to the point in a mother’s pregnancy where the fetus
has a detectable heartbeat.3 Prior to this bill’s enactment, North Dakota prohibited abortion “[a]fter the point in pregnancy when the unborn child may
reasonably be expected to have reached viability,” except when necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother.4
In restricting the availability of abortions, North Dakota’s H.B. 1456
contained two operative provisions. The first provision required a physician
performing an abortion to “determin[e], in accordance with standard medical
practice, if the unborn child the pregnant woman is carrying has a detectable
heartbeat.”5 However, this requirement was not applicable “when a medical
emergency exists that prevents compliance.”6 Violation of the heartbeattesting requirement subjected the performing physician to disciplinary action
before the state board of medical examiners.7 The bill provided, “Failure to
3. MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 770 (8th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016).
4. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-04(3) (West 2016). Further, the statute
defined “viable” as: “[T]he ability of an unborn child to live outside the mother’s
womb, albeit with artificial aid.” Id.
5. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d at 770 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. 1456 § 1.1,
63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013)).
6. Id. (quoting N.D. H.R. 1456 § 1.1).
7. N.D. H.R. 1456 § 1.2 (“If a physician performs an abortion on a pregnant
woman before determining if the unborn child the pregnant woman is carrying has a
detectable heartbeat, that physician is subject to disciplinary action under section 4317-31.”) (codified at § 14-02.1-05.1.2).
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determine whether a heartbeat is detectible is punishable through a disciplinary action against a physician by the North Dakota Board of Medical Examiners, which can include suspension or revocation of the physician’s license.”8
H.B. 1456’s second operative provision prohibited a physician from performing an abortion on a pregnant woman if the fetus had a “heartbeat [that]
ha[d] been detected according to the requirements of section 1.”9 Exceptions
were given if there was a medical emergency jepordizing the life or health of
the pregnant woman or the life of another unborn child.10 A physician found
in violation of this provision committed a felony, while the pregnant woman
faced no liability.11
MKB Management Corporation (“MKB”) and Dr. Kathryn Eggleston
(together, “Plaintiffs”) brought suit challenging the statute’s constitutionality
and sought a preliminary injunction.12 MKB is the sole abortion provider in
the state of North Dakota and does business as “Red River Women’s Clinic.”13 Dr. Eggleston is the clinic’s medical director and provides abortions to
the clinic’s patients.14
Plaintiffs requested preliminary injunctive relief to prevent Defendants
from enforcing H.B. 1456.15 Plaintiffs argued that the “statute [was] an unconstitutional abridgment of the right to abortion protected under the Four-

8. MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 954 F. Supp. 2d 900, 904 (D.N.D. 2013)
(citing N.D. H.R. 1456 §§ 1.2, 3), aff’d sub nom. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016).
9. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d at 770 (quoting N.D. H.R. 1456 § 2.1). Section 1 states:
Except when a medical emergency exists that prevents compliance with this
subsection, an individual may not perform an abortion on a pregnant woman
before determining, in accordance with standard medical practice, if the unborn child the pregnant woman is carrying has a detectable heartbeat. Any individual who performs an abortion on a pregnant woman based on the exception in this subsection shall note in the pregnant woman’s medical records that
a medical emergency necessitating the abortion existed.

N.D. H.R. 1456 § 1.1 (codified at § 14-02.1-05.1.1). See also id. at § 1.2 (codified at
§ 14-02.1-05.1.1).
10. N.D. H.R. 1456 § 2.2.a (codified at § 14-02.1-05.2.2a).
11. Id. § 2.4 (“It is a class C felony for an individual to willingly perform an
abortion in violation of subsection 1. The pregnant woman upon whom the abortion
is performed in violation of subsection 1 may not be prosecuted for a violation of
subsection 1 or for conspiracy to violate subsection 1.”) (codified at § 14-02.105.2.4).
12. Stenehjem,795 F.3d at 770.
13. Id.
14. Id. Dr. Kathryn Eggleston is a board-certified medical physician who is
licensed to practice in North Dakota. Id.
15. MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1061 (D.N.D. 2014),
aff’d sub nom. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016).
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teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”16 Plaintiffs’ primary
contention was that the statute banned virtually all abortions in North Dakota,
unconstitutionally banning abortions prior to viability of the fetus.17
The North Dakota Attorney General and members of the North Dakota
Board of Medical Examiners (collectively, “Defendants”) argued for the
enforcement of H.B. 1456.18 In their response, Defendants argued that a fetus
was viable upon conception19 and that H.B. 1456 was constitutional, as abortions could still be performed until the point a fetal heartbeat was detected.20
Further, Defendants contended that “a woman’s right to [an] abortion before
viability was not absolute and must be weighed against the state’s interest in
protecting the fetus and mother.”21 Thus, it was Defendants’ position that the
implementation of H.B. 1456 provided a valuable state interest in protecting
the life of an unborn child and protecting the physical and mental health of
the mother seeking an abortion.22 In doing so, Defendants believed they were
“preserving the integrity of the medical profession, preventing the coarsening
of society’s moral sense and promoting respect for human life.”23
The U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota granted Plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, whereupon Plaintiffs moved for summary
judgment.24 In support of their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs relied on the opinions of both Dr. Eggleston and Dr. Christie Iverson, a boardcertified obstetrician and gynecologist, as set forth in their affidavits.25
Through their affidavits, both argued that fetal cardiac activity was not detectable until about six weeks, and that the fetus was not viable until around
twenty-four weeks.26 More so, they stated that since most women do not
know they are pregnant until about six weeks, and with the clinic being open
for abortions just one day per week, women would be limited in their ability
to obtain an abortion to a single day during the pregnancy’s fifth week.27
Defendants responded with their own expert, Dr. Jerry Obritsch, a
board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist licensed in North Dakota.28 In
his affidavit, Dr. Obritsch stated that fetal cardiac activity was detectable by
about six to eight weeks, and that a fetus is viable from conception with the
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1060.
Dr. Jerry Obritsch argued for Defendants that an unborn child was viable
from conception because in vitro fertilization allows an embryonic unborn child to
live outside the womb for two to six days after conception. Id. at 1066.
20. Id. at 1062.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1061.
25. Id. at 1066.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1063.
28. Id. at 1066.
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use of in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), which allows the fetus to live outside the
womb for two to six days after conception.29
In granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the district court
stated that “[a] woman’s constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy before
viability has consistently been upheld by the United States Supreme Court for
more than forty years since Roe v. Wade.”30 The court believed there to be no
genuine issue of material fact, even though Dr. Obritsch provided a definition
of viability that would satisfy constitutional precedent, his definition was not
consistent with that of the Supreme Court or the medical community in general.31 The district court held that “H.B. 1456 clearly prohibits pre-viability
abortions in a very significant percentage of cases in North Dakota, thereby
imposing an undue burden on women seeking to obtain an abortion.”32
Defendants appealed this decision, contending that the trial court erred
in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and that doing so was an
abuse of the court’s discretion.33 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and held that the
North Dakota abortion law impermissibly infringed on the right to terminate
pregnancy before viability, as set forth by Supreme Court’s precedent that
states may not prohibit pre-viability abortions.34

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Abortion rights are by no means an unfamiliar topic for the Supreme
Court. First, Part III will provide the relevant legal history surrounding the
Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence, providing a foundation for examining the law as it stands today. Then, Part III will delve into the meaning of
the illusory term “viability” and how this term interplays with the Supreme
Court’s abortion standards.

A. The Supreme Court’s Abortion Jurisprudence
Prior to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Roe v. Wade, and
throughout a large portion of America’s history, states have vastly encumbered women’s right to an abortion.35 However, in 1973, the Supreme Court
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id. at 1070.
Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1074.
MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016).
34. Id. at 773.
35. David Masci & Ira C. Lupu, A History of Key Abortion Rulings of the U.S.
Supreme Court, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/
01/16/a-history-of-key-abortion-rulings-of-the-us-supreme-court/. Many state abortion laws enacted in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries attempted to protect
pregnant women and their fetuses by prosecuting those who performed abortions. Id.
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heard two cases, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, which declared state statutes
barring abortion to be a violation of basic protections granted by the Constitution.
In Roe, a pregnant single woman under the pseudonym “Roe” brought a
class action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Texas’s criminal
abortion laws.36 These laws criminalized all attempts to procure an abortion
– except for those performed with the purpose of saving the mother’s life.37
In determining this state statute to be unconstitutional and in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court developed the
following guidelines:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester,
the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical
judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother,
may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are
reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and
even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.38

In its decision, the Roe Court left “the State free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so long as those
restrictions are tailored to the recognized state interests.”39 The Court stated
that the physician maintained the right “to administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points where important state
interests provide compelling justifications for intervention.”40 The Court held
that “the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a
medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician.”41 While recognizing states’ interests in regulating abortions, Roe prevented states from creating laws that barred abortions during the first two
trimesters of pregnancy.42

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120 (1973).
Id.
Id. at 164–65.
Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (noting there were still exceptions making some restrictions permissible
during the second trimester under Roe).
42. Id. at 154, 164.
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In the Court’s simultaneous decision, Doe v. Bolton, Mary Doe, twentythree other individuals, and two nonprofit Georgian corporations promoting
abortion reform, challenged Georgia’s abortion statutes and claimed they
were unconstitutional.43 The applicable Georgia statute barred abortions –
except in cases where continued pregnancy would endanger the pregnant
woman’s life or injure her health, the pregnancy resulted from rape, or the
fetus was likely be born with a serious defect.44 In each of these scenarios,
this determination was to be made by a licensed Georgia physician in “his
best clinical judgment.”45 In addition to requiring those seeking an abortion
to be a Georgian citizen, the statute contained three further hurdles for women to cross: the abortion had to be performed in an accredited hospital, the
procedure had to be approved by the hospital staff abortion committee, and
the performing physician had to have approval by the independent examinations of two other licensed physicians.46
In its decision, the Supreme Court invalidated most of these procedural
requirements to receiving an abortion, in line with its logic in Roe.47 Further,
the Court stated that a woman could receive an abortion after a fetus was
viable if necessary to protect her health.48 Ultimately, however, the Court
followed suit with its Roe decision in saying, “[w]hether, in the words of the
Georgia statute, ‘an abortion is necessary’ is a professional judgment that the
Georgia physician will be called upon to make routinely.”49
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, a 1989 Supreme Court decision that came out of Missouri, was among one of the first major cases challenging the Roe and Doe holdings.50 This case involved state-employed
health care professionals and facilities offering abortion services who brought
a class action claim against the constitutional validity of a state statue regulating abortions.51 Here, the Missouri statute required physicians to conduct
viability tests on pregnant women at or past the twentieth week of pregnancy.52 Further, the statute did not allow abortions to be performed at public
facilities unless an abortion was necessary to save the life of the mother.53
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
statute while managing to avoid confronting Roe.54 The Court upheld the
statute’s viability testing requirement by arguing that the State could have an

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 185 (1973).
Id. at 183.
Id.
See id. at 183–84.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 192.
492 U.S. 490 (1989).
Id. at 501.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 499.
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interest in protecting the life of a fetus before the point of viability.55 The
Court also upheld the prohibitions against the use of public facilities and employees for conducting abortions, justifying its decision by saying that the
issue does not contravene the Court’s past abortion decisions.56
The scope of abortion limitations was defined once again in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.57 In Casey, the Supreme
Court implemented the undue burden test, as opposed to Roe’s trimester
framework, for evaluating abortion restrictions before viability.58 Under this
new test, a state may promote its interest in potential life by restricting the
availability of abortions before viability so long as the law’s “purpose or effect is [not] to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion.”59 In analyzing whether a state abortion law met constitutional
standards, Casey created a less rigorous standard than that set forth in Roe.
While Roe required abortion laws to undergo “strict scrutiny” analysis,60 Casey required a lesser “undue burden” standard.61
However, Casey did reaffirm Roe’s essential holding that women have
the right to the choice of an abortion before a fetus becomes viable.62 The
Court stated, “[T]he reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we
have given combined with the force of stare decisis.”63
In 2003, Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, prohibiting a physician from knowingly performing a partial-birth abortion, a form of
late-term abortion.64 This federal law immediately underwent judicial attack,
and by 2007, the law was tested by the Supreme Court in the case of Gonzales v. Carhart.65 Although the Court had previously struck down a state ban
on partial-birth abortion in Stenberg v. Carhart,66 here, the Court held that the
Partial-Birth Abortion Act defined the banned procedure in clearer terms and
upheld the statute.67 The Court further justified its holding by explaining that
the Act only banned a procedure used in obtaining an abortion and did not
prevent a woman from obtaining an abortion altogether.68 Perhaps most important, however, was Gonzales’s questioning of the continued validity of the

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 519.
Id. at 511.
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 837.
Id.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
Casey, 550 U.S. at 839.
Id. at 846.
Id. at 853.
18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012).
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
530 U.S. 914, 929–30 (2000).
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 149.
Id. at 156.
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Court’s abortion jurisprudence.69 This questioning of the Supreme Court’s
abortion jurisprudence was prominent in the decision of MKB Management
Corp. v. Stenehjem.

B. The Meaning of “Viability”
As stated by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, viability is the point at
which a fetus is “potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit
with artificial aid.”70 In the instant case, the court determined this to be
around seven months, but said it may occur as early as twenty-four weeks.
The Supreme Court’s decisions have consistently held that the point of viability was a matter of judgment for a physician. As set out in Colautti v. Franklin,
[A] physician determines whether or not a fetus is viable after considering a number of variables: the gestational age of the fetus, derived
from the reported menstrual history of the woman; fetal weight, based
on an inexact estimate of the size and condition of the uterus; the
woman’s general health and nutrition; the quality of the available
medical facilities; and other factors.71

Most state statutes also follow language similar to the Court’s definition
of viability. For example, Missouri defines viability as “that stage of fetal
development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely
outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems.”72 While
the legal wording of what constitutes viability is consistent today, the understanding and the actual point of viability evolved over time.
The roots of the term “viability” can be traced to the beginning of the
nineteenth century, where abortion was discouraged after the onset of quickening, which is the moment in pregnancy where the woman can feel fetal
movements.73 In 1935, the American Academy of Pediatrics defined an infant as being premature if she weighed less than 2500 grams at birth.74 While
the Academy did not define a weight for viability, 1250 grams was often
used, which correlated to approximately the twenty-eighth week in pregnancy.75 By the 1950s, respiratory issues in infants younger than thirty-seven
weeks were identified as the principal cause of death, leading to a distinction

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 187 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).
439 U.S. 379, 395–96 (1979).
MO. REV. STAT. § 188.015 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
Bonnie Hope Arzuga & Ben Hokew Lee, Limits of Human Viability in the
United States: A Medicolegal Review, 128 PEDIATRICS PERSP. 1047, 1047 (2011),
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/128/6/1047.full.pdf.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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between “premature” and “growth-restricted” infants.76 Over the next two
decades, there was an emphasis on neonatal technology.77
In the 1970s, mortality rates of infants born under 1800 grams were
“markedly improved” by neonatal technology.78 In addition, the medical
viability standard changed.79 By the 1980s, smaller infants were successfully
treated with more frequency, and the survival of infants born between twentyfour and twenty-eight weeks had become an “expected possibility,” setting
the contemporary range of viability.80
Continued evolution of neonatal biological medical advances led to increased survival rates for infants born at twenty-three and twenty-four weeks
by the 1990s.81 Among a recent study looking at infants weighing less than
400 grams at birth, about six percent of twenty-two-week-old infants survived, at least until discharged from the hospital, while about twenty-six percent of twenty-three-week-old infants survived.82 These numbers illustrate
the current contemporary limits of human viability.83
Of course, simply surviving until being discharged from the hospital
should not be the only factor considered when determining viability. Factors
such as the fetus’s expected growth potential and risk of developing later
health complications should also be relevant in determining overall health
compared to a fetus born later in pregnancy. Premature births, defined as
births before thirty-seven weeks, are notable for having a higher risk of health
problems, compared to later births.84 These risks include complications such
as long-term intellectual and developmental disabilities, lung and breathing
problems, and vision problems.85

IV. INSTANT DECISION
“Accordingly,” the Eighth Circuit noted, “we have no choice but to follow the majority of the Court in assuming the following principles for the
purposes of this opinion.”86 In its decision, the Eighth Circuit relied on the
precedent laid down by the Supreme Court in Roe, Casey, and Gonzales in
holding that “[b]efore viability, a State ‘may not prohibit any woman from
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1051.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Long-term Health Effects of Premature Birth, MARCH DIMES (Oct. 2013),
http://www.marchofdimes.org/complications/long-term-health-effects-of-prematurebirth.aspx.
85. Id.
86. MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss2/8

10

Duckworth: Raising Our Standards

2016]

RAISING OUR STANDARDS

529

making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy.’”87 More so, the
court explained that a state may not alter this right by creating an undue burden on a woman seeking to receive an abortion.88 This undue burden is said
to exist if a regulation’s “purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”89
However, simply placing a hindrance in the path to an abortion may not be
enough to create an undue burden:
On the other hand, “[r]egulations which do no more than create a
structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of
a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are
permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”90

In applying this standard, the Eighth Circuit determined that H.B. 1456
prohibited abortions before viability and did not conform to the requirements
set forth above.91 The court first noted that there was no dispute between the
parties concerning when a heartbeat was detectable in a fetus.92 This was
determined to take place at approximately six weeks.93 As this was not in
dispute, the court simply had to determine when viability occurs to conclude
whether the statute could be upheld.94
Defendants argued that viability occurs at conception because IVF “allow[s] an embryonic unborn child to live outside the human uterus (womb)
for two-six days after conception.”95 In contrast, Plaintiffs contended that
viability occurs at approximately twenty-four weeks, as they understood viability to mean “the time when a fetus has a reasonable chance for sustained
life outside the womb, albeit with lifesaving medical intervention.”96 The
court determined it was bound by the Supreme Court’s definition of viability
and characterized it as the time “when, in the judgment of the attending physician on the particular facts of the case before him, there is a reasonable likelihood of the fetus sustained survival outside the womb, with or without artificial support.”97 Because the court felt Plaintiffs’ definition of viability was
in line with that of the Supreme Court, the court determined viability to be at
or about twenty-four weeks.98 Thus, as H.B. 1456 barred abortions at ap87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007)).
Id. (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146).
Id. (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146).
Id. (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146).
Id. at 773.
Id. at 772.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 773 (quoting Dr. Obritsch’s testimony at trial).
Id. (quoting Dr. Iverson’s testimony at trial).
Id. at 772–73 (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388 (1979)).
Id. at 773.
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proximately six weeks, it impermissibly prohibited women from choosing to
have an abortion before the point of viability.99
In the instant case, the court also made a strong argument for the Supreme Court to reevaluate its abortion jurisprudence.100 The court believed
that the Supreme Court’s current viability standard has shown itself to be
unsatisfactory, as it gives too little consideration to the “substantial state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy.”101 The court continued, stating,
“By deeming viability ‘the point at which the balance of interests tips,’ the
Court has tied a state’s interest in unborn children to developments in obstetrics, not to developments in the unborn.”102 Because North Dakota developed
a reasonable point at which to measure its state’s interest in potential life, the
court believed the Supreme Court improperly “substitute[d] its own preference to that of the legislature.”103
Further, the Eighth Circuit argued that the Supreme Court should
reevaluate its jurisprudence, as the facts underlying Roe and Casey have
changed.104 The court believed the State’s evidence exemplified the balance
found in Roe between the choice of a mother and the life of the fetus.105
Here, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that many women do not have proper consultation before receiving abortions and many do not receive adequate information about the process.106 The court also stated that women who have had
abortions may have adverse health consequences and many women regret
having proceeded with an abortion.107 The court then concluded by discussing how the Supreme Court’s continued use of the viability standard discounts the legislative branch’s recognized interest in protecting the lives of
unborn children within the state.108

V. COMMENT
There is little question that the Eighth Circuit correctly decided that
H.B. 1456 impermissibly prohibited women from choosing to have an abortion before the point of viability according to precedent set out by the Supreme Court of the United States. As an intermediate court of appeals, the
Eighth Circuit virtually had no choice but to uphold the principles the Court

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 774 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,

876 (1992) (plurality opinion)).
102. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 861).
103. Id. (quoting Edwards v. Beck, 786 F.3d 1113, 1119 (8th Cir. 2015)).
104. Id. at 774–75.
105. Id. at 775 (quoting McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 2004)
(Jones, J., concurring)).
106. Id. at 775.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 776.
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previously established.109 Although the Eighth Circuit ultimately affirmed
the district court’s decision to overturn the statute, the Eighth Circuit did
make some very compelling arguments on why the Supreme Court may wish
to reevaluate its jurisprudence in this area.

A. The Substantive Due Process Right to an Abortion
While the underlying holding of Roe has yet to be overruled, it has become clear that the original reasoning behind the holding, providing a substantive due process right to an abortion before the point of viability, has been
weakened by a series of Supreme Court abortion cases.110
For instance, in Roe, the Supreme Court found a fundamental right at
stake – the right of a woman to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.111
As such, and this being a substantive due process challenge, the Court applied
strict scrutiny analysis in finding statutes barring abortions before viability to
be unconstitutional.112 By its decision in Casey, however, the Court already
appeared apprehensive to label the right to an abortion a fundamental right, as
shown through a vehement dissent and the Court’s newly created undue burden test.113 While this undue burden test was applied yet again in Gonzales,
the Court characterized it as more of a rational basis test in saying that Congress had a “rational basis to act” in refusing to allow partial-birth abortions
due to the “uncertainty” of the medical necessity.114 In their dissenting opinion, Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer stated, “[i]nstead of the
heightened scrutiny we have previously applied, the Court determines that a
‘rational’ ground is enough to uphold the Act.”115
As rational basis analysis merely requires the government to have a legitimate purpose in implementing a law, the government must simply act in a
manner reasonably related to achieving that goal.116 Put differently,
“[R]ational basis review, the most forgiving standard of constitutional scrutiny, nominally requires courts to establish as adequate the connection, or
‘nexus,’ between the state’s legislative ends and its legislative means.”117 If
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 772.
See discussion supra Part III.
See discussion supra Part III.
Supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 187 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[F]or
regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”).
117. Emma Freeman, Note, Giving Casey Its Bite Back: The Role of Rational
Basis Review in Undue Burden Analysis, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 279
(2013).
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rational basis scrutiny of state abortion laws was to be accepted, states could
vastly expand laws that restrict a woman’s right to an abortion. Theoretically, this would give states great latitude in creating abortion laws as they see
fit for their populace.
Cases such as MKB Management Corp. v. Stenehjem demonstrate that
true rational basis scrutiny has yet to be routinely applied. In Stenehjem,
North Dakota’s legislature determined that the detectable heartbeat of a fetus
was an appropriate measuring point for restricting abortions.118 As North
Dakota determined this to be the critical point at which to protect its interest
in human life, this could arguably meet the low or “nominal” standard of the
rational basis test. North Dakota could argue that it has developed an objective test that provides more consistent results than that of the ever-varying
viability standard. Further, North Dakota could argue that a heartbeat test
provides emotional significance to its citizens, given the way the term “heart”
is used metaphorically in society.119 While perhaps not reasons capable of
surviving strict scrutiny, states could contend that these reasons meet the rational basis test’s nominal benchmark.

B. The States’ Interest in Regulating Abortions
Even after the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Roe, states were
recognized as having some legitimate interest in protecting the lives of unborn children. As previously discussed, Roe left “the State free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so long
as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state interests.”120
Like the Eighth Circuit recognized in Stenehjem, a state may be better
suited to determine the interests of its people than the Supreme Court. States
generally have the ability through their legislative branches to have thorough
debates and investigations into recent medical and scientific advances and to
develop laws suited to these discoveries and the wishes of their constituents.121 Further, as abortion is such a sensitive topic for so many Americans
with no clear-cut “right answer,” perhaps the will of the people, and not the
will of the courts, should decide what abortion policies govern their states. In
118. MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016).
119. Danny Groner, Why’s a Heart Represent Love, Anyway?, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 7, 2013, 8:13 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/danny-groner/whys-a-heartrepresent-lo_b_2635820.html (“It was around the Middle Ages that the heart symbol
took on its current meaning. At that time, according to Christian theology, it was
meant to represent Jesus Christ and his love.”).
120. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973) (emphasis added); see supra note 39
and accompanying text.
121. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d at 774 (quoting Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So.3d 728, 742
(Ala. 2012) (Parker, J. concurring)) (“By taking this decision away from the states,
the Court has also removed the states’ ability to account for ‘advances in medical and
scientific technology [that] have greatly expanded our knowledge of prenatal life . . .
.’”).
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line with this reasoning, it has been widely held that a court should not substitute its own judgment or preference for that of the legislature.122 Although
often criticized for being no more than a fallback answer as to why a court
strikes down a heavily debated law, the argument maintains credence when
the court gives no reasoned analysis for doing so. Why should an arbitrary
line pulled from the sky and decided by a split court govern a line representing the wishes of a state’s constituents and supported by a reasoned argument?
As the court in Stenehjem articulated and as demonstrated in the forthcoming Part, “[b]y deeming viability ‘the point at which the balance of interests tips,’ the Court has tied a state’s interest in unborn children to developments in obstetrics, not to developments in the unborn. This leads to troubling consequences for states seeking to protect unborn children.”123

C. “Viability” – An Arbitrary Standard
As articulated by constitutional law scholar Professor Randy Beck,
“[S]election of a rule near the extreme end of available options creates the
appearance that the Court made a social or political decision, an impression
that can be dispelled only by providing a convincing rationale for the viability
rule grounded in neutral constitutional principles.”124
Currently, according to Gonzlaes, “Before viability, a State ‘may not
prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy.’”125 The United States’ viability standard falls approximately twice as
far into pregnancy as that of the most common international standard of
twelve weeks.126 Foreign standards, although by no means commanding authority, were relied on in past constitutional analyses and often contained
principles that the Court could embrace by citing traditional authority.127
While a line must be drawn for the enforcement of almost any law, the current viability standard for restricting abortions appears to create wide-ranging
and arbitrary results. While the same viability standard has existed since the
1970s, the timeframe in which a state may restrict abortions has increased.128
A twenty-four week old fetus in the 1970s would not have been considered
viable, and thus would not garner protection from abortion, while today it
122. Edwards v. Beck, 786 F.3d 1113, 1119 (8th Cir. 2015) (“To substitute its
own preference to that of the legislature in this area is not the proper role of a court.”).
123. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d at 774 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey
505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (plurality opinion)).
124. Randy Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
249, 252–53 (2009).
125. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (emphasis added) (quoting
Casey, 505 U.S. at 879).
126. Beck, supra note 124, at 267 (2009). Data from the Center of Reproductive
Rights shows that forty-one of fifty-six countries limit the availability of an abortion
right within twelve weeks or sooner. Id. at 264.
127. Id. at 262–63.
128. Edwards v. Beck, 786 F.3d 1113, 1118 (8th Cir. 2015).
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likely would.129 This standard has allowed an entire class of fetuses to garner
legal protection today while the same class would not have had the benefit of
such protection before.130
Thus, the standard provides differential treatment, as determined by the
year of a fetus’s conception, linking a constitutional standard to an irrelevant
factor.131 The Supreme Court went as far as to recognize this in its Casey
decision, discussing how the viability threshold has moved several weeks
closer to the point of conception than the time of the Roe decision.132 As
stated in Stenehjem, “How it is consistent with a state’s interest in protecting
unborn children that the same fetus would be deserving of state protection in
one year but undeserving of state protection in another is not clear.”133
Whether it is for or against abortion, a standard as fluid and arbitrary as the
current viability standard is not a palatable solution.
With the constant evolution of medical technology and advances in
healthcare, it is only logical that the point of viability from a medical perspective would continue to expand. Should we continue, then, to allow states to
restrict abortions after the point of viability if the point of viability becomes
almost immediate in the fetus following conception? More so, the viability
standard currently in place could provide mixed results simply due to the
region a person lives in or the socioeconomic characteristics they possess.134
Is the viability standard for the person with access to elite hospitals and advanced medical technology equal to the viability standard of the person
whose only health access is a rural clinic? Again, regardless of personal
opinion on the subject, the reasoning behind such a standard must be questioned with such varying results. While there are other legal standards currently in place that have different implications depending on locale,135 abortion simply involves too high of stakes and is too controversial to be among
those standards.

D. The Future of the Supreme Court’s Abortion Jurisprudence
As long as abortion remains a hot-button topic in this country, it is sure
to remain relevant in forthcoming litigation. One such case appearing in the
next session of the Supreme Court’s docket involves a Texas law requiring
doctors performing abortions in the state to possess “admitting privilege”136
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Beck, supra note 124, at 258.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 258.
MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016).
134. Beck, supra note 124, at 258.
135. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin,
408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)) (applying “contemporary community standards” in analyzing obscenity).
136. “Admitting privilege is the right of a doctor, by virtue of membership as a
hospital’s medical staff, to admit patients to a particular hospital or medical center for
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at a nearby hospital.137 Further, the Texas law requires abortion clinics to
meet expensive operating standards and bans abortions after twenty weeks of
pregnancy.138 After arguments were presented on how the statute was designed to protect women’s health, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit upheld the statute in a reversal of a substantial portion of the district
court’s decision.139 While the Supreme Court implemented temporary injunctions on some of the statute’s requirements for clinics, pending litigation,
the statute has already had a dramatic impact on abortion rights within the
state. The number of abortion clinics in Texas has shrunk from over forty to
just ten, and it is argued this number will be cut in half again if the statute is
upheld.140
While not a direct attack on Roe’s viability standard, statutes like the
Texas law appear to be attempting to circumvent the Supreme Court’s decision and test the limits of Casey’s undue burden test. Although these statutes
do not strictly prohibit abortion against the Court’s viability standard, they
make abortions unavailable or highly inconvenient for women to receive.
The Court’s handling of this case, and cases similar to it, could influence the
next wave of abortion-restricting legislation. If upheld, statutes like this
would surely arise in conservative states across the nation.141 If denied, it
will be crucial to look toward the language of the Court’s decision to determine how broadly its opinion applies. If narrowly tailored, it would be safe
to expect pro-life jurisdictions to continue thinking of any available means to
restrict women’s access to an abortion.
In the Eighth Circuit, and Missouri in particular, similar measures have
already been undertaken to make abortions more difficult to obtain. The
Eighth Circuit upheld a Missouri statute requiring that abortion providers
have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals, holding that the requirement
“furthers important state health objectives.”142 Currently, Missouri allows
abortion up until twenty-one weeks and six days after a woman’s last menproviding specific diagnostic or therapeutic services to such patient in that hospital.”
Admitting Privileges (Health Care) Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL,
http://definitions.uslegal.com/a/admitting-privileges-health-care/ (last visited Mar. 5,
2016).
137. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748
F.3d 583, 587 (5th Cir. 2014).
138. Brittney Martin, Texas AG Asks Supreme Court to Uphold State’s Abortion
Restrictions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Oct. 5, 2015, 4:48 PM), http://trailblazers
blog.dallasnews.com/2015/10/texas-ag-asks-supreme-court-to-uphold-states-abortionrestrictions.html/.
139. Abbott, 748 F.3d at 605.
140. Taylor Wofford, Abortion, Affirmative Action and Other Supreme Court
Cases to Watch This Session, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 6, 2015, 6:39 AM), http://www.news
week.com/supreme-court-cases-watch-session-380119.
141. See id.
142. Women’s Health Ctr. of W. Cty., Inc. v. Webster, 871 F.2d 1377, 1381 (8th
Cir. 1989).
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strual cycle, at which point it is banned unless the woman’s life or health is in
jeopardy.143 Additionally, Missouri currently requires a woman seeking an
abortion to receive state-directed counseling seventy-two hours before receiving an abortion, as well as parental consent for minors seeking to receive an
abortion.144
In light of the recent controversy surrounding Planned Parenthood,145
abortion policy is again a highly-debated issue in the Missouri Capitol.146
Predicted Republican proposals for the 2016 legislative schedule on the issue
range from requiring memorials for aborted fetuses to ramping up oversight
of already established state abortion laws.147

VI. CONCLUSION
While the Eighth Circuit’s decision in MKB Management Corp. v.
Stenehjem to overturn a North Dakota statute restricting abortions past the
point of a detectable heartbeat in a fetus was legally sound, perhaps the greatest takeaway from the decision was the court’s critique of the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on the issue of abortion. Public sentiment on either end
of the abortion spectrum has become white noise to the Supreme Court in its
abortion analysis, but who knows the impact that direct opposition from an
intermediate appellate court could have? The Eighth Circuit has clearly taken
the position that the current standard for measuring when a state government
can restrict a woman’s right to an abortion is unworkable, arbitrary, and in
need of change. Further, strong arguments can be made that the judicial
branch should not make this decision at all, but rather, the legislature could
handle the issue more effectively and thoughtfully. Why allow states to continuously backdoor the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions on abortion
rather than setting clear legal standards on the issue? The future argument
over abortion rights in the United States should not be decided in arguments
of just or unjust, moral or immoral, but rather grounded in reason and backed
by sufficient rationale.

143. Reproductive Health Services, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.planned
parenthood.org/planned-parenthood-st-louis-region-southwest-missouri/who-weare/our-services/reproductive-health-services (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
144. State
Facts About Abortion: Missouri, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/missouri.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2016). In
line with the national abortion rate trend, Missouri’s abortion rate has dropped from
13.4/1,0000 to 5/1000 in women aged 15 to 44 from 1991–2011. Id.
145. Missouri GOP Lawmakers Brainstorm New Abortion Legislation,
SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Oct. 15, 2015, 6:32 AM), http://www.newsleader.com/story/news/politics/2015/10/15/missouri-gop-lawmakers-brainstorm-newabortion-legislation/73974786/.
146. See id.
147. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss2/8

18

